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Chairmen Johnson, Ranking Member Xavier Becerra and members
of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for providing the Association of Administrative Law
Judges (AALJ) the opportunity to submit this statement. My name is
D. Randall Frye. I am a United States Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ or Judge) assigned to the Social Security Administration (SSA).
I have been hearing Social Security Disability cases in Charlotte,
North Carolina for about 15 years. I have also served as
Administrative Law Judge for the National Labor Relations Board
for one and one-half years. I am currently President of the AALJ,
which represents the approximately 1400 Administrative Law Judges
employed at the SSA. One of the stated purposes of the AALJ is to
promote and preserve due process hearings in compliance with the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Social Security Act for
those individuals who seek adjudication of program entitlement
disputes within the SSA. It is the longstanding position of the AALJ
that ensuring full and fair due process de novo hearings brings justice
to the American people. The AALJ represents most of the
approximately 1600 administrative law judges in the entire Federal
government.
Some criticism has been recently levied against the world's
largest adjudicatory system. However, the concerns raised do not
present issues that are insurmountable. In this statement, the AALJ
proposes changes we believe are necessary to make the federal
disability administrative judiciary more efficient and effective as well
as addresses some of the issues raised during the past year. In
addition, the AALJ believes the proposed changes, most of which are
not new, would be cost effective and would well serve the American
people. For example, the AALJ has advocated for over a decade that
our government be represented in cases before Administrative Law
Judges with the full right to appeal. We are extremely pleased that
such a program is now supported by Senator Coburn.1

1

Back in Black–Preserving Social Security for Future Generations, U.S.
Senator Tom Coburn, M.D. (R-OK), July 18, 2011.
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THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY
In 1946, the Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) to reform the administrative hearing process and procedures
in the Federal government and to protect, inter alia, the American
public by giving ALJs decisional independence. "Congress intended
to make hearing examiners (now ALJs) 'a special class of semiindependent subordinate hearing officers' by vesting control of their
compensation, promotion and tenure in the Civil Service
Commission (now the Office of Personnel Management) to a much
greater extent than in the case of other Federal employees."
[Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 US 931
(1953)]. The agencies employing them do not have the authority to
withhold the powers vested in Federal ALJs by the APA
Prior to the enactment of the APA, the tenure and status of these
hearing examiners were governed by the Classification Act of 1923,
as amended. Under that Act, the classification of the hearing
examiners was determined by ratings given to them by the Agency
and their compensation and promotion depended upon their
classification. This placed the hearing examiners in a dependent
status with the Agency employing them. Many complaints were
voiced against this system alleging that hearing examiners were
"mere tools of the Agency" and thus subservient to Agency heads
when they decided and issued decisions on issues involving Agency
determinations appealed to them. With the adoption of the APA,
Congress intended to correct these problems. As earlier noted, this
rather significant reform was undertaken to protect the American
public by giving ALJs decisional independence. Indeed, the Act's
legislative history makes abundantly plain that the APA was intended
to be broad sweeping legislation designed to restore to American
government fundamental freedoms for the American people,
freedoms which had become clouded in the murky waters of
unregulated administrative organizations that were not contemplated
by the nations' founders, and whose conduct in the realms of
investigation, prosecution and adjudication had become so
burdensome as to all but undo what was thought preserved in the
Constitution. The widespread concern regarding the absence of an
independent federal administrative judiciary to hear and decide
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complex administrative issues was underscored by the President's
Committee on Administrative Management in 1937.2
While the APA codified, inter alia, decisional independence of
ALJs, it is not inconsistent with the Social Security Act. Thus in
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (1971) the Court
found that the Social Security Act conforms with and is consistent
with the APA. Specifically, the Court found that the APA provisions
do not differ from nor supersede the authority given ''the Secretary . .
. by section 205(a) and (b) to establish procedures." The broad sweep
of the APA must not be minimized. The APA extends its reach to
agency rulemaking and adjudications. No court has found that the
Social Security Act stands apart from the APA. To the contrary,
many courts have found that the two statues stand in pari material—
to be considered together.
The APA was enacted to ensure that the American people were
protected from arbitrary decision making by government bureaucrats.
The grant of decisional independence to federal administrative law
judges is fundamental to the ability of the ALJ to bring justice to the
American people. When federal agencies overreach and encroach on
our decisional independence, the promise of Constitutional due
process to the American people is broken. In our view, there is
absolutely no tension between the Social Security Act and the APA.
The tension that does exist at SSA has arisen ONLY when
unenlightened bureaucrats unlawfully interfere with the duties and
responsibilities of the ALJ. The fact that the APA provides some
degree of protection to members of the federal administrative
judiciary should not be viewed as a negative. Indeed, the minimal
employment protection offered by the APA is absolutely essential to
due process and the ability of the judge to correctly adjudicate cases
filed pursuant to the Social Security Act.
2

The Committee observes of the so-called 'fourth branch' of government, the
administrative agencies: "They are vested with duties of administration . . . and at
the same time they are given important judicial work . . . The evils resulting from
this confusion of principles are insidious and far-reaching Pressures and influences
properly enough directed toward officers responsible for formulating and
administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in which to adjudicate
private rights. But the mixed duties of the commissions render escape from these
subversive influences impossible. Furthermore, the same men are obliged to serve
both as prosecutors and as judges. This not only undermines judicial fairness; it
weakens public confidence in that fairness."
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HIGH VOLUME ADJUDICATIONS
Federal ALJs at SSA work in a stressful, high volume
adjudicatory environment. In recent years, the Agency has placed far
too much emphasis on numerical performance rather than on correct
judicial decision making. According to Agency officials, Judges
should spend no more than 2 ½ hours on each case. At the same
time, hearing office staff attorneys are allotted 8 hours to prepare a
draft denial decision for the judge's review.
To be sure, federal ALJs with conditional lifetime appointments
and decisional independence are essential to ensure that the
American people, who file approximately 700,000 to 800,000 cases
each year, will be provided full and fair due process hearings. In this
context, due process and justice can only be accomplished if the
judge has sufficient time to develop and review each case, provide a
thorough hearing, deliberate and decide the case and issue a wellreasoned decision which is fully consistent with the facts of the case
and the relevant law. While numerical goals are useful tools, these
goals must not be used as quotas, as to do so would likely deny due
process to the claimant and impair the judge's ability to bring justice
to the American people. The current production line mentality robs
the judge of one of the most important elements of due
process...time. Time is necessary for ALJs to develop and review the
evidence, conduct a full and fair hearing, deliberate, and prepare and
issue a correct decision. Again, goals are important; quotas run
contrary to the Social Security Act, the Administrative Procedure Act
and the U.S. Constitution. In addition, and most detrimental to the
American people, is the Agency's application of constant pressure on
judges to continue to increase the number of cases they adjudicate.
The pressure of quotas is forcing judges to hear cases before they are
prepared to do so. This impairs the judge's ability to adequately and
thoroughly adjudicate cases. While some judges may be forced to
hear and decide a higher volume of cases, higher producing judges
tend to pay a higher percentage of claims.
As one Hearing Office Chief Judge pointed out, "If
goals are too high the corners get cut and the easiest
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thing to do is to grant a case."3
While it may be true that over 75 percent of judges are meeting
the goal-quota of 500-700 decisions annually, what is not present in
the data is the fact that most of those judges would appear before you
and tell you that in order to meet this level of production, they simply
cannot adequately review all of the evidence in the cases they decide.
In our view, the current misplaced emphasis on numbers has
perverted our system of justice. At an estimated value of $300,000
per case, the AALJ believes the American people are entitled to have
a judge who is given adequate time to develop and review all of the
evidence in each case, conduct a thorough hearing and issue a correct
decision.
As you know, SSA ALJs have adjudicated cases at record levels
in each of the past ten years. However, the AALJ believes the SSA
adjudicatory system could be made more efficient, effective and
economical with changes and modifications that will improve the
process. On many prior occasions, the AALJ has urged consideration
by the Agency of significant changes to the disability adjudication
system.
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION
When sued, insurance companies proceed to trial represented by
the best law firms in the nation. When a claim is filed for disability
benefits, the government (SSA) proceeds to trial without legal
representation. When an ALJ rules against a claimant in a disability
case, the claimant can (and usually does) file an appeal with the
Appeals Council. When an ALJ rules against the government in a
disability case creating a $300,000 liability, the government does not
have a right of appeal. There is clearly something wrong with this
picture. In the context of disability adjudication, the government is
the trustee of billions of taxpayer dollars. In our view, it is
irresponsible to place these funds at risk at hearing without legal
representation.
The AALJ has advocated for well over a decade that the SSA be
3

See statement of the Hon. Patrick O'Carroll, Inspector General, SSA, before
the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means,
September 16,2008, p. 5.
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represented at administrative hearings by attorneys.
This
representation should be provided by attorneys from the Office of
General Counsel, with authority to advocate the American people's
interest and with the authority to compromise, settle, and appeal
cases which the government believes were erroneously decided. The
cost of such representation could easily be funded by resources saved
by eliminating or restructuring the Regional Offices of the Office of
Disability Adjudication and Review (ODAR).
The Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB) has called for the
government to be represented as well. In its 2001 report, the SSAB
made the following statement:
[T]he fact that most claimants are now represented by
an attorney reinforces the proposition, which has been
made several times in the past, that the agency should
be represented as well. Unlike a traditional court
setting, only one side is now represented at Social
Security's ALJ hearings. We think that having an
individual present at the hearing to defend the
agency's position would help to clarify the issues and
introduce greater consistency and accountability into
the adjudicative system. It would also help to carry
out an effective cross-examination of the claimant.
Many ALJs have told us that they are sometimes
reluctant to conduct the kind of cross-examination
they believe should be made because, upon appeal, the
record may make them appear to have been biased
against the claimant. Consideration should also be
given to allowing the individual who represents the
agency at the hearing to file an appeal of the ALJ
decision.
This issue has not escaped the analysis of academic commentators.
Two professors made the following caustic observation in the
Journal of Economic Perspectives (Volume 20, Number 3, Summer
2006, pages 71-96 at page 93):
A second promising step would be for the Social
Security Administration to consider attorney
representation at Administrative Law Judge hearings,
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as the independent Social Security Advisory Board
(2001) has repeatedly recommended [emphasis
added].
At present, claimants are typically
represented at appeal by legal and medical advocates
who have a financial stake in the claimant 's success.
The Social Security Administration, by contrast, is
entirely dependent on the Administrative Law Judge
to protect the claimant's and the public's interests
simultaneously (U.S. GAO, 1997). Permitting the
Social Security Administration to provide a
representative or attorney to the hearings would
ameliorate this almost comically lopsided setting
[emphasis added] in which the Social Security
Administration currently loses nearly three-quarters of
all appeals.
The overriding purpose of the hearing is "fact-finding." The
AALJ believes that the model used by SSA to conduct hearings is a
relatively poor fact-finding model as compared to the adversarial
model. We believe that the center of any change at SSA should
include, at a minimum, conversion from the inquisitorial model to the
adversarial model. The adversarial system of adjudication is
fundamental to our American judicial system. The AALJ knows of
no state or Federal court that uses the inquisitorial model to
adjudicate issues. SSA uses a model unheard of throughout our land
to find facts in a judicial-type setting.
THE BURDEN OF WEARING 3 HATS
Federal ALJs who hear and decide cases at SSA have an
unusually complex job. As a fact-finding system, it is difficult for
one person to perform all three functions imposed on ALJs: to
represent the interest of the claimant; to represent the interest of the
Trust Fund; and to serve as an impartial decision maker (''three
hats"). To function and appear as an unbiased fact-finder and at the
same time to examine a claimant vigorously and thoroughly, as one
would expect a lawyer defending the trust fund to do, is not possible.
In fact, having the judge defend the Trust Fund as well as the
claimant's interest, places the judge in an untenable situation.
Oftentimes vigorous examination of the claimant by the judge leads
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to allegations against the judge of bias and prejudice. Some judges
have even been subjected to discipline by the Agency because of
aggressive examination of the claimant, done in pursuit of truth and
justice.
The benefit of having a lawyer representing the government with
the authority to settle cases should not be minimized. In fact, this
benefit may be even greater to the administration of justice than the
government's role as an advocate. One of the factors contributing to
SSA's high volume jurisdiction is the fact that the vast majority of
cases are tried. However, nowhere else in our judicial system is a
judge required to take to hearing such a high percentage of cases
compared to the total docket. Were the state and Federal courts
required to actually conduct trials in the same proportion as disability
judges are forced to do with their dockets, those courts would
abruptly crash under the weight of trying virtually all of their
dockets. Having a lawyer with authority to negotiate and settle cases
has the potential to drastically reduce the number of cases that are
tried, and conceivably reduce the number of judges and support staff.
Having government representation would also ensure that the
evidentiary file is complete and that all necessary development has
been conducted prior to the hearing. This would permit the judge to
become fully informed about the nature and extent of the claimant's
alleged impairments prior to the hearing. This type of prehearing
preparation is necessary for the judge to understand complex medical
evidence and to evaluate the facts, as found at hearing, in the context
of relevant law and agency regulations.
The AALJ believes an adversarial model would far better serve
the claimants' and the public's interests by being a better fact-finding
system and by more efficiently disposing of cases through
compromise and settlement. With a lawyer representing the
government, the government can then decide which cases to defend.
Instead of hearing 90% of the cases (assuming 10% are awarded on
the record without a hearing), far fewer cases would go to hearing
because of the ability to settle the case without a hearing. This
process would also serve to drive down the backlog quickly.
Another efficiency, which should accrue to having government
representation, lies in the shepherding of cases through the appeals
process. Identifying those claims that are likely to prevail before the
judge and agreeing with the claimant's position to enter a favorable
award, means one fewer case that has to be scheduled and tried. The
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government lawyer can then focus resources on defending those
cases which ought to be defended, rather than spend time on
perfunctory hearings.
As above noted, the pressure on judges to produce an ever
increasing number of cases has reached intolerable levels. In
evaluating our concerns, it is essential that members of the
Subcommittee understand the role of staff in the disability claims
process. When case files arrive in a hearing office, they must be
"worked up" or "pulled," that is, electronically organized for use in
the hearing. This is a significant task, which if done properly,
requires skill and one to three hours of time, as the contents of a
given file arrive in the hearing office in random sequence,
unidentified, without pagination, with duplications and without any
numbered exhibits or table of contents to locate the exhibits. A staff
member must identify and eliminate duplicate exhibits from the same
source, label the remaining exhibits, arrange the exhibits in
chronological order, number and paginate the exhibits and prepare
the list of exhibits. After a case is worked up, it is ready for the
assigned judge to review.
In this process, the AALJ believes it important for members of
the subcommittees to consider how much time ALJs should be
spending on each disability case. At an estimated value of $300,000
per case, we respectfully suggest that this is not a rhetorical question.
A judge must invest sufficient time to understand all of the facts in
each case as well as applicable law and regulations. It is imperative
for the judge to review all evidence in the file, averaging 600 pages,
and then direct staff to obtain any missing evidence including
consultative medical examinations. When the record is fully
developed, the judge determines if a hearing is needed or whether a
favorable decision can be made on the evidence of record, without a
hearing. In most cases, a hearing is required and the judge then
determines which expert witnesses will be required for the hearing
and if additional courtroom security is necessary. After this review,
the staff secures the expert witnesses and schedules the case for
hearing. Once the hearing is scheduled, the judge continues to be
involved with the case reviewing newly submitted evidence and
considering and resolving pre-hearing motions and issues. Typically,
a day or two before the hearing, the judge will conduct another
review of the file to evaluate additional evidence and to insure
familiarity with the facts and issues for the hearing. Many times, last
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minute evidence is submitted at the hearing which unnecessarily
delays or otherwise impedes the adjudication of the case. When the
hearing is concluded, the judge must deliberate, prepare thorough
decisional instructions for the writing staff and later review and edit
the draft decision before signing it. Sometimes, additional evidence
is submitted after the hearing, or even after the decision has been
drafted but not yet signed by the judge, causing the expenditure of
additional judge time. As can be gleaned from this brief overview,
the disability adjudicatory process is complex and time consuming.
As earlier noted, in courts and other agencies, trials and
adjudications are conducted under the adversarial process in which
the case is developed during trial by evidence introduced by opposing
counsel. The judge studies and reviews the evidence as the trial
progresses. However, in Social Security disability hearings, ALJs
preside over an inquisitorial process, in which the judge develops the
facts and the arguments both for and against granting benefits. In
large part, this is required because the SSA is not represented at the
hearing and the courts are sympathetic to unrepresented claimants.
Therefore, ALJs are required to wear the so-called three hats as
referenced above. After reviewing the record evidence, the judge
often determines that additional evidence must be obtained. This
inquisitorial system places more responsibility on the judge.
Hearings based on this model are more time consuming and labor
intensive for the judge.
Certainly, there is variance in the number of decisions issued by
each judge. Such a distribution is normal in all human activities, and
is usually graphed as a "bell curve." However, the number of
decisions issued by a judge is dependent on numerous factors such as
adequate and well trained staffing, the complexity of the cases, the
number of unrepresented claimants and the sophistication of the bar.
These are factors clearly beyond the control of the judges.
Quite compelling is data from SSA's last study on the issue of
numerical goals for ALJs, Plan for a New Disability Claim Process.
This study was conducted in 1994 and projected a time line for a
disability claim at all levels of the process. The study, based on an
average month, concluded that a reasonable disposition rate for an
ALJ should be in the range of 25 to 55 cases per month. The study
also revealed that a judge would spend a range of 3 to 7 hours
adjudicating each case. Consistent with this study is the following
testimony of former SSA Chief ALJ Frank Cristaudo before the
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House Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Social
Security, on September 6, 2008, in response to questions from
Congressman Xavier Becerra:
Mr. Becerra. Do me a favor. I am going to run out of
5 minutes real quickly. I am just asking, do you
believe that they [ALJs] can get to upwards of 600 to
700 dispositions on an annual basis?
Judge Cristaudo. Well, what we are asking the judges
to try to do-we haven't mandated, we are asking-is to
get to 500. The 700 was more of an indication to this
other group that are doing thousands of cases that at
some point there may be a limit as to how many cases
a Judge can actually do and still do quality work. That
is what the 700 was about.
There have been changes in the process since 1994, but most of
those serve to slow down, not speed up, the process. The average file
size grows every year. Reviewing electronic files (eFiles) takes more
time than reviewing paper files. Even electronic signing (eSigning)
of decisions takes longer than using a pen. While technology may
have reduced the Agency's overall processing time for claims, it has
not reduced the amount of time most judges must spend in
adjudicating a case.
In considering numerical performance, it is important to
understand that a judge must carefully review the voluminous
documentary evidence in the claimant's file to effectively prepare and
conduct the hearing and to issue a correct decision. With an average
estimated cost to the trust fund of $300,000 per case, a judge hearing
40 cases per month is entrusted to correctly decide cases valued at
$10,000,000 per month, or $120,000,000 annually. Nonetheless,
judges are being subjected to various pressures to meet everincreasing production "goals" which in many cases become de facto
quotas in violation of the APA and infringes on the constitutional
requirement for ALJs to provide a full and fair due process hearing.
As a result of SSA's pressure to meet or exceed goals-quotas,
many judges are forced to give cases less thorough reviews; adequate
evidentiary development may not be undertaken; facts may go
unseen; and incorrect assessments may be reached. In some offices,
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judges are being pressured to accept un-worked cases that have not
been organized by staff which is inconsistent with the APA
requirement that hearings be held with an identifiable record. The
judge must waste substantial time in reviewing un-worked files that
may have many duplicate records, records out of sequence and
exhibits which are neither identified nor paginated. This lost time
should be, instead, spent on reviewing, hearing and deciding more
cases.
Reviewing a 600 page case file is not unlike reading a 600-page
novel. In both instances, one must read carefully in order to
understand the story being presented. Skipping pages in either
distorts one's understanding of the whole story. If a judge skips
evidentiary pages in a case file, the judge could make incorrect
decisions in that case, harming either the claimant or costing the
American taxpayers $300,000 for the incorrect decision. Selectively
reviewing evidence is a short cut that must cease; otherwise fairness
and justice disappear from our adjudicatory system.
PEER REVIEW
The AALJ has advocated for an ALJ Peer Review Program at
SSA for approximately twenty years. The AALJ believes that such a
system would efficiently and effectively address ALJ performance
and conduct issues in a manner that would be beneficial to the
Agency, the Judge and the American people. Instead, the Agency
continues to address these issues in a manner that always leads to
costly and time consuming litigation. The Agency has not only
consistently opposed the establishment of a Peer Review Program but
also any similar program. This past year, the AALJ proposed a joint
workgroup to study and evaluate establishing an ALJ Peer Review
Program. The Agency strongly opposed the creation of such a work
group.
ADJUDICATORY TRANSPARENCY
In our democratic form of government, the need for transparency
in federal administrative hearings is essential. Conducting hearings
in secret fosters suspicion and creates misunderstandings about our
system of justice. To build and maintain trust in our adjudicatory
system by the American people, we must conduct our hearings in the
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light of day. The AALJ has long advocated that hearings be open to
the public. We believe there is a substantial public interest in how
disability adjudication is conducted. We believe that the public's
interest is generally paramount to a claimant's interest in keeping the
hearing closed to the public. Open hearings would lend transparency
to our administrative adjudication system and instill confidence
regarding our disability system of justice. Moreover, should the case
be appealed to the Federal courts, the entire record is open to the
public. Also, we believe the Notice of Hearing should include all
relevant information, not only the issues to be heard, but also other
information such as the time, date and place of the hearing and the
name of the assigned judge.
ARE THE MEDICAL VOCATIONAL GUIDELINES RELEVANT TODAY
For many reasons, Americans are living longer and healthier
lives. The nature and scope of work performed by the American
people is significantly different than 40 years ago. There are far
fewer unskilled jobs in the market place and few jobs that require
significant physical activity. As a result, application of the Agency's
Medical Vocational Guidelines (grid rules) oftentimes forces the ALJ
to award benefits when jobs are available that claimants could
perform. In our view, this approach to evaluating disability is out of
date and should be eliminated. Rather than using these outdated
guidelines, judges should rely on vocational testimony. At a
minimum, the grid rules should be revised to reflect the increased life
span of Americans.
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CLOSING THE RECORD
The AALJ has advocated for the adoption of procedural rules,
however, the Agency has consistently refused to do so. No other
judicial system functions without rules of procedure. Further, no
other judicial system operates by permitting the record to remain
open continuously throughout the adjudicatory and appellate process.
For example, medical evidence could be withheld from the ALJ and
later submitted to the Appeals Council in order to secure a remand of
the case and another hearing. There is no incentive under the current
system to submit evidence in a timely fashion.
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Procedural rules would ensure an efficient, effective and orderly
judicial system. Like a road map, procedural rules would aid
litigants by giving specific guidance on how to navigate the
adjudicatory process. At SSA such rules could cover, inter alia,
submission of evidence, dismissals, prehearing conferences,
subpoenas, oral argument, representatives' responsibilities, ex parte
communications, continuances and prehearing development.
Perhaps one of the most important areas ripe for procedural rules
is closing the record. The AALJ has long advocated that the record
should be closed at the conclusion of the hearing unless the ALJ
directs otherwise. Any post hearing evidence submitted to the ALJ
prior to the issuance of a decision would be admitted into the record
upon a showing that such evidence is material and could not have
been submitted prior to the close of hearing. If a party waives a
hearing, the record would be closed on the date the decision is issued.
THE VALUE OF MEDICAL EXPERT WITNESSES
Medical expert witnesses serve an important role in the
adjudicatory process in that their testimony assists the ALJ in
reaching the correct decision in a given case. Presently, the Agency
has a dearth of medical expert witnesses because their pay has not
increased in more than a decade. Pay rates need to rise, and the SSA
needs to develop a national pool of medical specialists who can
appear at hearings by way of video. In most cases, courts are more
likely to uphold a decision if a knowledgeable medical expert witness
testifies at a disability hearing. The cost for using a medical expert
witness is less than the cost of holding another hearing if the case is
remanded as a result of the lack of medical expert testimony.
REDIRECTED RESOURCES TO REDUCE THE BACKLOG
The SSA expends a great deal of money on maintaining ten
Regional Offices within ODAR. Since ODAR Regional Offices do
not directly contribute to the processing and adjudication of cases, as
they handle few, if any, cases, Regional Offices are merely another
layer of bureaucratic administration that deprives ODAR hearing
offices of personnel. Over the last fifteen years, the Regional Offices
have added substantial staff, which could have been better deployed
in the hearing offices. The AALJ advocates the elimination of the
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ODAR Regional Offices and the reassignment of Regional Office
staff to hearing offices to handle the backlog, with the savings from
office rental costs being redirected to the hearing offices. The overall
responsibility for the disability adjudication system, including current
Regional functions, should be consolidated in the Office of the Chief
Administrative Law Judge and under the management of the Chief
Administrative Law Judge.
VIDEO HEARINGS
Face to face hearings provide the best method of delivering due
process to the American people. While there may be some instances
where video hearings are advisable (such as handling cases in remote
areas that would require excessive travel), widespread use of the
National Hearing Centers (NHCs) reduces the ability of the SSA to
provide due process to the American people. Video hearings should
be kept to a minimum in order to preserve the right of every
American to have the opportunity to make their case in person to the
Judge. No claimant should be induced into submitting to a video
hearing by the Agency's promise of a much earlier hearing date. No
video hearing can provide the same experience and the same contact
between a claimant and Judge as an in-person hearing. Moreover,
video hearings require the use of a second courtroom; one for the
judge and one for the claimant who appears at the hearing by video.
This requirement for additional space imposes significant additional
costs for the American taxpayer.
INDEPENDENT CORPS NEEDED
Critically important to any successful democracy is an
independent judicial system. At the SSA, ALJs do not have the
independence envisioned by the APA, the Social Security Act, or
the United States Constitution. Agency officials are now imposing
daily, weekly, monthly and yearly production quotas.
The
imposition of these quotas, often euphemistically referred to as
goals, has had a deleterious impact on case adjudication. Placing
disability judges in an organization separate from SSA would
better ensure justice for the American people.
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For two decades, the disability adjudication at SSA has
suffered from numerous failed management initiatives. With the
exception of changes undertaken by former Commissioner Joanne
Barnhart, all other initiatives were established and implemented by
the Agency without the involvement of the AALJ, whose members
are the most knowledgeable about disability adjudication. It is no
surprise that those initiatives failed, with great cost to the American
people.
The establishment of an independent corps of disability judges
would better serve the public than the current system which has a
long history of failures.
CONCLUSION
The Social Security Program is absolutely vital to the American
people. Our judges are working extremely hard to address the
backlog of cases under very adverse circumstances. We are most
hopeful that you will further pursue the issues we raise to ensure that
claimants receive a full and fair due process hearing by
administrative law judges and, at the same time, that the American
public receives justice.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement and to
present our views on these important issues.

Respectfully submitted,
D. Randall Frye
President, AALJ

